We study fair resource allocation when the resources contain a mixture of divisible and indivisible goods, focusing on the well-studied fairness notion of maximin share fairness (MMS). With only indivisible goods, a full MMS allocation may not exist, but a constant multiplicative approximate allocation always does. We analyze how the MMS approximation guarantee would be affected when the resources to be allocated also contain divisible goods. In particular, we show that the worst-case MMS approximation guarantee with mixed goods is no worse than that with only indivisible goods. However, there exist problem instances to which adding some divisible resources would strictly decrease the MMS approximation ratio of the instance. On the algorithmic front, we propose a constructive algorithm that will always produce an α-MMS allocation for any number of agents, where α takes values between 1/2 and 1 and is a monotone increasing function determined by how agents value the divisible goods relative to their MMS values.
Introduction
Fair division concerns the problem of allocating a set of goods among interested agents in a way that is fair to all participants involved. The goods involved could be heterogeneous and divisible, usually modeled by a cake, in which case the problem is also known as cake-cutting; in some other cases, the goods are heterogeneous and indivisible, and the problem is known as indivisible resource allocation.
Due to its subjective nature, a plethora of fairness notions have been proposed and investigated in different resource allocation scenarios (see [Young, 1995] and [Brams and Taylor, 1996 ] for a survey). In particular, as one of the most classic and widely known fairness notions, Steinhaus [1948] proposed that in an allocation that involves n participating agents, each agent should receive a bundle which is worth at least 1/n of her value for the entire set of goods. An allocation satisfying such property is then known as a proportional allocation. Moreover, Steinhaus also showed that a proportional allocation can always be found for any number of agents over any divisible goods. However, this is not the case when goods are indivisible, with the simplest counterexample of two agents dividing a single valuable good. In order to circumvent this issue, Budish [2011] presented a natural alternative to the classic proportionality notion that also works for indivisible goods, known as the maximin share (MMS) guarantee. In this definition, the maximin share (MMS) of an agent is defined as the largest value she can get if she is allowed to partition goods into n bundles and always receives the least desirable bundle. An allocation is said to be an MMS allocation if every agent receives a bundle which is worth at least her maximin share.
The notion of MMS nicely captures the local measure of fairness even when the goods to be allocated are indivisible. A natural question then arises of whether an MMS allocation always exists in all problem instances. Surprisingly, showed that even with additive valuation functions, an MMS allocation may not always exist. However, a 2/3-MMS allocation can always be found, in which each agent is guaranteed to receive a bundle worth at least 2/3 of their MMS value. In other words, if we define the MMS approximation guarantee of a problem instance as the largest α such that the instance admits an α-MMS allocation, the results in imply that the worst MMS approximation guarantee across all indivisible problem instances is strictly less than 1 and at least 2/3. Since then, many subsequent works have been carried out on the improvements of MMS approximation guarantee, design of simpler algorithms, etc. [Amanatidis et al., 2017; Barman and Krishnamurthy, 2017; Ghodsi et al., 2018; Garg et al., 2018; Garg and Taki, 2019] . MMS has also been adopted as the fairness solution concept in several practical applications [Budish, 2011; Goldman and Procaccia, 2015] .
Even though MMS was mainly studied in the context of indivisible resource allocation, it is also a well-defined fairness notion in a more general setting where both divisible and indivisible goods are to be allocated. Many real-world scenarios, including but not limited to divorce or inheritance settlements, involve allocating simultaneously divisible goods such as land or money and indivisible goods such as houses or cars. What fairness notion should one adopt when dividing resources of such mixed types? The fair allocation of mixed divisible and indivisible goods was first studied by Bei et al. [2020] , in which the authors proposed a new fairness notion called envy-freeness for mixed goods (EFM) that generalizes envy-freeness, another well-studied fairness notion, to the mixed goods setting. The maximin share guarantee, on the other hand, can be directly applied to the mixed goods setting without any modifications. This allows us to compare the results of MMS for mixed goods directly to those for indivisible goods.
In this paper, we aim to provide such a comparison. More specifically, we extend the analysis of MMS allocations to the setting with mixed types of goods, and study its existence, approximation, as well as computation. In particular, we hope to answer the following questions:
1. Is the worst-case MMS approximation guarantee across all mixed goods instances the same as that across all indivisible goods instances? 2. Given any problem instance with only indivisible goods, would adding some divisible resources to it always (weakly) increase the MMS approximation ratio of this instance?
3. How to design algorithms that could find allocations with good MMS approximation guarantee in mixed goods problem instances?
Our Results
In this paper, we answer the three questions posed above.
In our first set of results, in Section 3, we show that any problem instance of mixed goods can be converted into another problem instance with only indivisible goods, such that the two instances have the same MMS value for every agent, and any allocation of the indivisible instance can be converted to an allocation in the mixed instance. This reduction directly implies that the worstcase MMS approximation guarantee across all mixed goods instances is the same as that across all indivisible goods instances. In other words, in terms of worst-case MMS approximation guarantee, having mixed types of goods will not make things worse compared to having only indivisible goods. This is not a surprising result, because the non-existence of MMS allocations only arises when the resources to be allocated become indivisible. It is therefore reasonable to think that adding divisible goods to the set of indivisible goods can only help with the MMS approximation guarantee. However, as we will show next, this intuition no longer holds at the per-instance level. In particular, we show that there exists a problem instance with only indivisible goods, and when a small amount of divisible goods is added to the instance, the MMS approximation guarantee of the instance strictly decreases.
Next in Section 4, we focus on finding allocations with good MMS approximations with mixed types of goods. More specifically, we show via a constructive algorithm that given any problem instance with mixed goods, there exists an α-MMS allocation, where the parameter α, ranged between 1/2 and 1, is a monotone increasing function of how agents value the divisible goods relative to their MMS values. The idea of the algorithm is to repeatedly assign some agent a set of indivisible goods along with a piece of cake to reach the agent's α-MMS value, and then reduce the problem to a smaller size. When the cake to be allocated is heterogeneous, the algorithm also makes use of a generalized fairness notion of weighted proportionality to help allocate the cake. On the computational front, we show PTAS algorithms for approximating the MMS value of an agent and for computing an (1 − ǫ)α-MMS allocation in a mixed goods problem instance. These algorithms run in time polynomial in n, m, L for any constant ǫ > 0, where n is the number of agents, m is the number of indivisible goods, L is the bit length of an input.
Lastly, in Section 5, we discuss the relation between MMS and the recently introduced envyfreeness for mixed goods (EFM) in the mixed goods setting. Generally speaking, neither the MMS nor the EFM imply the other. We also provide a result showing what fraction of MMS can be implied by an EFM allocation.
Related Work
As mentioned earlier, proportionality fairness was first introduced seven decades ago in the seminal work [Steinhaus, 1948] in the context of cake-cutting. Since then, several efficient algorithms have been proposed [Dubins and Spanier, 1961; Even and Paz, 1984] , and a matching lower bound has been found by Edmonds and Pruhs [2011] .
Despite the full-fledged theory of cake cutting [Brams and Taylor, 1996; Robertson and Webb, 1998; Barbanel, 2005] , it was not until recently attracted significant attention on fair division of indivisible goods. Maximin share fairness, often regarded as a generalization of proportionality, was introduced by Budish [2011] . surprisingly showed that an MMS allocation may not always exist, but a 2/3-MMS allocation always exists for any number of agents. The approximation guarantee for MMS was further improved to 3/4 by Ghodsi et al. [2018] . MMS allocations of indivisible resources have also been extensively studied in several other settings, including for agents with unequal entitlements [Farhadi et al., 2019] or in different groups [Suksompong, 2018] , for goods forming an undirected graph [Bouveret et al., 2017; Lonc and Truszczynski, 2018] , for allocations under matroid constraints [Gourvès and Monnot, 2019] or in conjunction with economic efficiency [Igarashi and Peters, 2019] , as well as in the context of chore division, where chores refer to negatively valued items [Barman and Krishnamurthy, 2017; Aziz et al., 2017 Aziz et al., , 2019a Huang and Lu, 2019] . Caragiannis et al. [2019] introduced pairwise maximin share (PMMS), which is incomparable with MMS. Barman et al. [2018] defined a stronger fairness notion than MMS, called groupwise maximin share guarantee (GMMS).
Besides proportionality and MMS, another prominent fairness notion in resource allocation is envy-freeness (EF) [Foley, 1967] , which requires that each agent weakly prefers her own bundle to any other agent's bundle. It follows from definition that envy-freeness implies proportionality. An envy-free allocation of divisible goods for any number of agents always exists [Alon, 1987] and can be computed via a discrete and bounded algorithm [Aziz and Mackenzie, 2016] . With indivisible goods, envy-freeness may not always be achievable. The notion is then often relaxed to envyfreeness up to one good (EF1), which always exist for any number of agents and can be computed efficiently [Lipton et al., 2004] .
Recently, Bei et al. [2020] initiated the study of fair allocation of mixed divisible and indivisible goods. They introduced the fairness notion of envy-freeness for mixed goods (EFM), which unifies EF and EF1 to the mixed good setting. Bei et al. [2020] showed that an EFM allocation with mixed goods always exists for any number of agents and investigated its computational aspects. Finally, a related line of research incorporates money into the fair division of indivisible goods, with the objective of finding envy-free allocations [Alkan et al., 1991; Maskin, 1987; Klijn, 2000; Meertens et al., 2002] . In a recent work, Halpern and Shah [2019] studied the amount of money needed for agents with additive valuations to achieve envy-freeness. Their results were further improved by Brustle et al. [2019] . Moreover, Caragiannis and Ioannidis [2020] considered the optimization problem of minimizing amount of subsidy to obtain envy-freeness for an allocation instance.
Preliminaries
In this work, a resource allocation problem instance I = (N, M ∪ C) contains a set of agents N , a set of indivisible goods M , and a set of ℓ heterogeneous divisible goods or cakes C .
Let M = {1, 2, . . . , m} be the set of indivisible goods. Each agent i ∈ N has a non-negative utility u i (g) for each indivisible good g ∈ M . We assume that each agent's utility for a set of indivisible goods is additive, that is, u i (M ′ ) = g∈M ′ u i (g) for any i ∈ N and M ′ ⊆ M .
Let C = {D 1 , D 2 , . . . , D ℓ } be the set of divisible goods, we assume without loss of generality that each cake D i ∈ C is denoted by the interval [(i − 1)/ℓ, i/ℓ]. Thus the entire set of divisible goods is represented by one cake C = [0, 1]. 1 A piece of cake is a finite union of subintervals of [0, 1].
Each agent i has a non-negative integrable density function f i . Given a piece of cake S ⊆ [0, 1], agent i's value over S is then defined as u i (S) = S f i dx. Denote by f = (f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n ) the vector of density functions; f is called a density profile.
Denote by G = M ∪ C the set of mixed goods. Let M = (M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M n ) be a partition of indivisible goods M into n bundles such that agent i receives M i . Let C = (C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n ) be a partition of the cake C such that agent i gets a piece of cake C i . An allocation of mixed goods
We now define the fairness notions considered in this paper. We focus on the maximin share fairness, a generalization of the classical proportionality fairness.
The maximin share value of agent i is MMS i (n, G). Every partition in arg max P∈Πn(G) min j∈[n] u i (P j ) is called an MMS partition for agent i.
For notational convenience, we will simply write MMS i when parameters n and G are clear from the context.
We say a 1-MMS (or full-MMS) allocation satisfying the (full) maximin share fairness and write MMS as a shorthand for 1-MMS. To slightly abuse the notation, we will also refer to an agent's maximin share value as MMS.
Precision and Input Representation. When discussing the computational aspects, it is necessary to specify the precision and representation of the input problem instance. In this paper, we assume that u i (g)'s for each i ∈ N, g ∈ M and u i (C) for each i ∈ N are all rational numbers, and the whole input can be represented in no more than L bits.
We also adopt the Robertson-Webb (RW) query model to access agents' density functions for the cake. In the RW model, an algorithm is allowed to ask each agent the following two types of queries:
Eval: An evaluation query returns u i ([x, y]) of agent i over interval [x, y] .
Cut: A cut query of β for agent i from point x returns a point y such that u i ([x, y]) = β.
In this paper, we assume that each query in the RW model takes unit time.
MMS Approximation Guarantee
In this section, we examine how mixed goods affect the existence and approximation of MMS allocations.
Worst Case MMS Approximation Guarantee
An MMS allocation, while being an appealing solution concept, may not always exist in every problem instance with indivisible goods . Therefore one has to resort to approximate MMS allocations. Allocating mixed types of goods is a generalization of the indivisible good case, and therefore suffers from the same issue. We start by analyzing the worst-case MMS approximation guarantee for mixed good problem instances.
Definition 3.1. Given a mixed good problem instance I, let γ(I) denote the largest α such that the problem instance admits an α-MMS allocation. We also call γ(I) the MMS approximation guarantee of problem instance I.
We further define two constants
In other words, γ M is the worst MMS approximation guarantee across all mixed goods problem instances, and γ I is the worst MMS approximation guarantee across all problem instances that contain only indivisible goods. Previous works have showed that γ I < 1 ) and γ I ≥ 3 4 (Ghodsi et al. [2018] ). It is straightforward from definition to see that γ M ≤ γ I . In the following, our first result shows that γ M is also no less than γ I . This is proved via the following reduction theorem. 
Proof. We first transform the mixed goods instance I = (N, M ∪ C) into an instance I ′ = (N, M ′ ) with only indivisible goods. Consider an agent i and an MMS partition P i for this agent in I. It is safe to assume that P i divides cake C into at most n intervals with at most n − 1 cuts. Then, by collecting all cuts of all n MMS partitions P 1 , . . . , P n on C, they cut the cake into at most n(n − 1) + 1 pieces. We can treat these pieces on C as a set M ′′ of indivisible "frozen pieces". Together with M , we now have M ′ = M ′′ ∪ M . Given any allocation A ′ of M ′ , we can easily convert it into an allocation A of G by transforming those 'frozen cake pieces' back to normal cake pieces. This also gives u i (A i ) = u i (A ′ i ) for each agent i ∈ N , which proves the first part of Theorem 3.2.
Lastly, it is clear that every agent can have the same MMS partition in I ′ as that in I, because the cuts do not affect their MMS partitions. This implies that MMS i (n, M ′ ) ≥ MMS i (n, M ∪ C) for each agent i ∈ N . On the other hand, the first part of this theorem also implies MMS
Theorem 3.2 directly implies the following result.
In other words, having mixed types of goods does not affect the worst-case MMS approximation guarantee across all problem instances.
As another corollary, this also means that if there exists a universal β-MMS algorithm for indivisible goods for some β, it immediately implies that every problem instance of mixed goods also admits a β-MMS allocation. We will discuss more on the algorithmic implication of this result in Section 4.
Cake Does Not Always Help
Note that the equation in Corollary 3.3 is about the worst-case MMS approximation guarantee across all problem instances. Perhaps surprisingly, we will next show that such equivalence may not hold on a per-instance level. In particular, we will demonstrate via an example that sometimes, adding some divisible resources to some problem instance I may hurt its MMS approximation guarantee value γ(I).
Theorem 3.4. There exist some agent set N , indivisible goods M , and divisible goods C, such that
In other words, adding some divisible goods to the set of resources may decrease the MMS approximation guarantee of this problem instance in some cases.
In the following we explain the intuition of the theorem proof. We want to find a problem instance I = (N, M ) such that γ(N, M ) < 1, and the instance should have the following properties.
Fix an agent i. In her MMS allocation, the least valued bundle is unique, i.e., the value of the least valued bundle is strictly less than that of the second least valued bundle.
If this is the case, then given a cake C with a small enough value ǫ, the new MMS value MMS i (n, M ∪ C) should be exactly MMS i (n, M ) + ǫ.
Now suppose that in the instance I, all the agents have this property. This means that every agent's MMS value will be increased by ǫ when we add a cake C of a small enough value ǫ to the instance I. The second required property of I is that in any γ(N, M )-MMS allocation, there are at least two agents that receive γ(N, M ) times their MMS values.
With these two properties, the actual cake C will not be enough for distributing to all the agents while clinging to a large enough MMS approximation ratio γ(N, M ). In other words, with the cake C added, the new MMS ratio γ(N, M ∪ C) will be decreased, comparing to γ(N, M ).
Finally, the counterexample used to show the non-existence of MMS allocation in can be utilized to construct the instance I that satisfies all above mentioned properties. The details are omitted here. The full proof can be found in the Appendix.
Algorithms for Computing Approximate MMS Allocations
The previous section investigates MMS approximation guarantee, which is the best possible MMS approximation of a problem instance. In this section, our goal is to design algorithms that could compute allocations with good MMS approximation ratios in a mixed goods problem instance. We hope such algorithm can be flexible, in the sense that when the problem instance contains only indivisible goods, the MMS approximation of the output allocation should match or be close to the best approximation ratio for indivisible goods previously known; on the other hand, when the resources contain enough of the divisible goods, the indivisible goods would become negligible, and our algorithm should be able to produce an allocation that gives each agent their full MMS value.
As the main result of this section, in the following we present such an algorithm. We will show that the algorithm will always produce an α-MMS allocation in the mixed goods setting for any number of agents, where α is a monotone increasing function of how agents value the divisible goods relative to their MMS values and ranges between 1/2 and 1.
Theorem 4.1. Given any mixed good problem instance (N, M ∪ C), an α-MMS allocation always exists, where
Furthermore, for any constant ǫ > 0, we can compute a ratio α ′ and an allocation A in time polynomial in n, m, L such that:
Here n is the number of agents, m is the number of items, and L is the total bit length of all input parameters.
The remaining of this section is dedicated to the proof of this theorem. The proof consists of the following steps.
Section 4.1: We first focus on a restricted case in which the cake to be allocated is homogeneous to every agent. We show via a constructive, but not necessarily polynomial time algorithm that an α-MMS allocation always exists in such setting.
Section 4.2: Next we generalize the above algorithm to the general case with heterogeneous cake, using the concept of weighted proportionality in cake-cutting.
Section 4.3:
We discuss how to convert the algorithm to a polynomial time algorithm at the cost of a small loss in the MMS approximation ratio.
We also discuss the implication of this theorem, and how to further improve the approximation ratio α in Section 4.4.
Homogeneous Cake
We begin with a special case where the cake to be allocated is homogeneous, meaning that each agent values all pieces of equal size the same. In other words, the value of a piece of cake to each agent depends only on the length of the piece 2 . We refer the homogeneous cake asĈ.
The Algorithm
The complete algorithm to compute an α-MMS allocation is shown in Algorithm 1. Our algorithm is in spirit similar to the algorithm in Ghodsi et al. [2018] . After initialization, the algorithm can be decomposed into two phases as follows:
• Phase 1: allocate big goods (lines 4-7). Algorithm 1 repeatedly allocates some agent a single indivisible good which has value at least α times this agent's MMS value. Then, both the agent and the allocated good are removed from all further considerations.
ALGORITHM 1: Mixed-MMS-Homogeneous(N, M ∪Ĉ)
Input: Agents N , indivisible goods M and homogeneous cakeĈ, utility and density functions. 
15 end 16 Give all remaining goods to the last agent. 17 return (A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n )
• Phase 2: allocate small goods (lines 8-15). This phase executes in rounds. In each round, Algorithm 1 chooses an agent i * and allocates some indivisible goods B (formed at line 10) along with a piece of cake [a, x i * ] to agent i * (line 13). Then again, both the agent and her goods are removed from the instance.
The Analysis
Algorithm 1 consists of two phases. We analyze each of them separately.
Phase 1: Allocate big goods First, when goods are all indivisible, Amanatidis et al. [2017] showed that allocating a single good to an agent does not decrease the MMS values of other agents. Here we show that this result holds in the mixed goods setting as well. Proof. Removing a single indivisible good in an MMS partition of agent i affects exactly one bundle and each of the remaining n − 1 bundles has value at least MMS i (n, G). Therefore, we have MMS i (n − 1, G \ {g}) ≥ MMS i (n, G).
Denote by N 1 the set of remaining agents and G 1 the set of unallocated goods just before Phase 2 is executed. Let n 1 = |N 1 |. Applying Lemma 4.2 n − n 1 times, we have that for each agent i ∈ N 1 , MMS i (n 1 , G 1 ) ≥ MMS i (n, G). In addition, each agent i who leaves the system in the phase receives an item of value at least α · MMS. This implies that Phase 1 will not affect the correctness and termination of Algorithm 1. It simply adds the property that in Phase 2, each remaining agent i will value each of the remaining goods less than α · MMS i .
Phase 2: Allocate small goods
In this phase, at each round, for the agent i * selected at line 12, we show that it satisfies two properties:
(2) For each agent j remains in N , u j (A i * ) ≤ MMS j .
(1) is straightforward by the way each x i is computed at line 11. To show (2) is true, we remark that because no single good is valued more that α · MMS i for any agent i. Therefore the set B selected at line 10 must satisfy u j (B) ≤ MMS j for all j ∈ N . After line 11 it continues to satisfy that u j (B ∪ [a, x j ]) ≤ MMS j for each j ∈ N . Then because i * is selected to be the smallest value, one would have u j (
In particular, property (2) ensures that the last agent at line 16 is still left with enough goods to reach her MMS value. Therefore every agent i will receive value at least α · MMS i after the two phases. It only remains to show that the cakeĈ is enough to be allocated throughout the process. In other words, x i for each agent i ∈ N at line 11 is always well defined in each round.
Proof. Line 2 in Algorithm 1 indicates that for each agent i ∈ N , u i (Ĉ) ≥ (n − 1) · (2α − 1) · MMS i . As a result, each agent i has value at least (2α − 1) · MMS i for a 1 n−1 fraction of the entire cakeĈ. It is also clear that Phase 2 has been executed at most n − 1 times during the algorithm run. That is to say there are at most n − 1 times if cutting a piece ofĈ and allocating this piece to an agent.
Based on whether there exists some agent who has value at least 1 − α times her MMS for goods in B (line 10), we distinguish two cases.
• Line 10: there exists some agent j with u j (B) ≥ (1 − α) · MMS j . As mentioned earlier, a 1 n−1 fraction ofĈ is worth at least (2α − 1) · MMS j . Thus it together with B is enough to give agent j a value of at least α · MMS j . This means at line 11, the length of [a, x j ] is no more than 1 n−1 . Moreover, Algorithm 1 chooses the agent who claims the smallest piece of cake as agent i * at line 12, which means the length of [a, x i * ] is again no more than 1 n−1 . Combining the fact that Phase 2 executes at most n − 1 times, if this case holds every time, the cake will be enough.
• Line 10: u j (B) < (1 − α) · MMS j for each agent j. In this case, B is set to be M at line 10.
Note that after the first time of such case, M will become empty, and the agents left will divide only the cake for the remaining rounds. Let k be the number of the remaining agents when M becomes empty. By property (2) that we showed above, we know the remaining cake ALGORITHM 2: The Mixed MMS Algorithm Input: Agents N , indivisible goods M and heterogeneous cake C, utility and density functions. 1 LetĈ = [0, 1] be a homogeneous cake with u i (Ĉ) = u i (C) for each agent i ∈ N .
is valued at least k · MMS i for each remaining agent i. Thus it is enough for each agent i to receive a piece with value at least α · MMS i .
Combine everything together, we conclude that Algorithm 1 is a correct algorithm that always outputs an α-MMS allocation.
Heterogeneous Cake
We now show how to extend algorithm 1 to the general setting with a heterogeneous cake C. The new algorithm follows a very simple idea as follows. First we replace cake C with a homogeneous cakeĈ such that u i (Ĉ) = u i (C) for each agent i, and allocate resources M andĈ to all agents using Algorithm 1. LetĈ i be the cake allocated to agent i. Note that sinceĈ is homogeneous, only the length ofĈ i matters, which we denote as w i . BecauseĈ has total length 1, w i also represents the fraction of the cakeĈ allocated to agent i. Next, we view w i as the entitlement (or weight) of agent i to the real cake C, and obtain the actual allocation of cake C via a procedure known as the weighted proportional allocation.
Weighted proportional cake-cutting This concept generalizes the proportional cake-cutting to the weighted case. Formally, assume that every agent i ∈ N is assigned a non-negative weight w i , such that i∈N w i = 1. We call the vector of weights w = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n ) a weight profile.
Definition 4.4 (WPR). Given a weight profile w, an allocation C = (C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n ) of cake C is said to satisfy weighted proportionality (WPR) if for every agent i ∈ N , u i (C i ) ≥ w i · u i (C).
A weighted proportional allocation of cake gives each agent at least her entitled fraction of the entire cake from her own perspective. The proportionality fairness (Definition 2.1) is a special case of WPR with weight profile w = (1/n, 1/n, . . . , 1/n). With any set of agents and any weighted profile, a weighted proportional allocation always exists [Cseh and Fleiner, 2018] . In the following, we will assume that our algorithm is equipped with a protocol WPRAlloc(N, C, w) that could return us a weighted proportional allocation of cake C, among the set of agent N with weight profile w.
The complete algorithm to compute an α-MMS allocation of mixed goods for any number of agents is shown in Algorithm 2. To show that this algorithm can find an α-MMS allocation with mixed goods that contain a heterogeneous cake, it suffices to prove the following two simple facts.
1. MMS i (n, M ∪ C) = MMS i (n, M ∪Ĉ). This is obvious because both C and C ′ are divisible with u i (C) = u i (Ĉ). Only changing the density of a cake will not affect the MMS value of any agent.
2. u i (C i ) ≥ u i (Ĉ i ). This is because by weighted proportionality, we have
Computation
We investigate the computational issues in finding an α-MMS allocation in this part. Note that Algorithm 2 is not a polynomial time algorithm unless P=NP. This is because it requires the knowledge of every agent's MMS value, which is NP-hard to compute even with only indivisible resources .
To obtain a polynomial time approximation algorithm, we first show how to approximate the MMS value of an agent with mixed goods, then focus on obtaining an approximate α-MMS allocation.
Approximate MMS value with mixed goods When goods are indivisible, Woeginger [1997] showed a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) to approximately compute the MMS value of an agent. More specifically, given any constant ǫ > 0 and any agent, we can partition the indivisible goods into n bundles in polynomial time, such that each bundle is worth at least 1 − ǫ of that agent's MMS value.
By utilizing this PTAS algorithm from Woeginger [1997] , here we present a new PTAS algorithm to approximate MMS values for mixed goods.
Lemma 4.5. Given any mixed goods instance I = (N, M ∪ C) and constant ǫ > 0, for any agent i ∈ N , one can compute a partition (P 1 , . . . , P n ) of M ∪ C in polynomial time, such that
Proof. Let agent i cut the cake C into ⌈ 2n ǫ ⌉ disjoint intervals worth at most ǫ·u i (C) 2n each to this agent. Denote byC the collection of these discretized, indivisible intervals. The new discretized instance is then denoted by I ′ = (N, M ∪C). This is a problem instance with only indivsible goods.
We first claim that
The first inequality holds trivially by definition. We proceed to show the second. Consider an MMS partition T of I for agent i. We construct a partition T ′ of I ′ as follows. First let the partition of its original indivisible goods M be exactly the same as that in T . We then distribute the intervals iñ C into these n bundles. For any bundle whose value is less than 1 − ǫ 2 · MMS i to agent i, add one interval at a time to this bundle until agent i's value for this bundle falls in 1 − ǫ 2 MMS i , MMS i . This is possible because MMS i ≥ u i (C)/n and each interval is worth at most ǫ·u i (C) 2n ≤ ǫ 2 · MMS i . AlsoC will have enough pieces for these allocations because in T , each bundle is worth at least MMS i to agent i. Repeat this procedure for all bundles. Finally distribute any remaining intervals to any of these bundles arbitrarily. Let the resulting partition be T ′ .
By the end of these procedures, each bundle in T ′ is worth at least (1 − ǫ 2 ) · MMS i . Then by the definition of MMS, the second inequality holds. We remark that these steps are not actually implemented in our algorithm. They are only used to demonstrate the difference of MMS values for the two instances. Now, because I ′ is a problem instance with only indivisible goods, we can compute a partition (P 1 , . . . , P n ) such that min j∈N u i (P j ) ≥ (1 − ǫ 2 ) · MMS i (n, M ∪C) via the PTAS algorithm from [Woeginger, 1997] . It then holds that
Lemma 4.5 also implies that we can compute in polynomial time a value MMS ′ i , such that
Approximate α-MMS allocation Now we turn to the polynomial time algorithm for computing an approximate α-MMS allocation. The algorithm is almost identical to Algorithm 2 except for 1. at line 1 of Algorithm 1, we compute the approximate values MMS ′ i , which is at most MMS i and at least (1 − ǫ) · MMS i for each agent i ∈ N ; 2. at line 2 of Algorithm 1, we compute the ratio α ′ using the approximate values MMS ′ .
A similar analysis to Lemma 4.3 shows that the new algorithm with these approximate values will still terminate.
According to Lemma 4.5, we know MMS i ≥ MMS ′ i for each i ∈ N , which implies that α ′ ≥ α. Next, for any agent i, by the design of the algorithm, she is guaranteed a bundle with value at least
Time complexity analysis In light of Lemma 4.5, computing approximate MMS values takes polynomial time. Then the only step that needs time complexity analysis is the weighted proportional allocation protocol WPRAlloc(N, C, w) at line 4 of Algorithm 2. When all weights are rational numbers, Cseh and Fleiner [2018] gave an implementation of the protocol using O(n log D) queries, where D is the common denominator of weights. They also showed that their implementation is asymptotically the fastest possible. We have assumed that our input has size at most L bits. Then each of the arithmetic operations in steps before line 4 (Algorithm 2) keep the numbers rational with polynomial bit size. Thus, by applying the protocol from Cseh and Fleiner [2018] , WPRAlloc at line 4 of Algorithm 2 can be implemented in polynomial time. Summarize everything together, we obtain a polynomial time algorithm.
Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 together complete the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Discussions and Improvements of Theorem 4.1
Theorem 4.1 has several implications. For example, a direct corollary from it shows the amount of divisible good needed to ensure that the instance admits a full-MMS allocation.
Corollary 4.6. Given a mixed good problem instance I = (N, M ∪ C), if u i (C) ≥ (n − 1)MMS i holds for each agent i ∈ N , then an MMS allocation is guaranteed to exist.
This means even with the presence of indivisible items, as long as there are enough divisible goods, a full-MMS allocation can always be found. However, this corollary should not be interpreted as that this is the least amount of divisible goods required. For example, Halpern and Shah [2019] studies the allocation of indivisible goods and a very special type of divisible goods, money. They investigated the least amount of money needed for a problem instance to have an envy-free allocation. An envy-free allocation is also a full-MMS allocation. However, their result and this corollary are incomparable.
Boosting the approximation ratio In Theorem 4.1, the smallest value for α is 1/2, achieved when the resources contain only indivisible goods. In this case, the theorem ensures that a 1/2-MMS allocation always exists. However, there is a gap between this 1/2 guarantee from our result and that of the best known result with only indivisible goods, which is 3/4 due to Ghodsi et al. [2018] and Garg and Taki [2019] . In the following, we show that a simple procedure can boost the MMS approximation ratio computed by our algorithm to (almost) match the currently best known ratio for indivisible goods.
First, combining Theorem 4.1 with Corollary 3.3 (γ I = γ M ), we can first improve the value α directly to max{α, γ I } in Theorem 4.1. Next, computational-wise, suppose there exists an algorithm that guarantees to output a β-MMS allocation with indivisible goods for some β. Then given a mixed good problem instance, we first compute α ′ via Theorem 4.1 and compare it with β: if α ′ ≥ β, we directly apply Theorem 4.1; otherwise, we cut the cake into small intervals, each valued at most ǫ for each agent, and use the β-MMS algorithm to obtain the allocation of this instance with only indivisible goods. In summary, we have the following strengthened result:
Theorem 4.7. A max{α, γ I }-MMS allocation always exists for any number of agents.
In addition, if there exists a polynomial time algorithm that can always output a β-MMS allocation with indivisible goods, then for any constant ǫ > 0, there is another polynomial time algorithm that computes a (1 − ǫ) max{α, β}-MMS allocation with mixed goods.
The currently best known β is 3 4 by Ghodsi et al. [2018] and Garg and Taki [2019] . Any better β found in the future would immediately imply a better MMS approximation guarantee in the mixed goods setting as well.
Relation of MMS and Envy-Freeness for Mixed Goods
Proportionality fairness, and its generalization, MMS, are often compared to another well studied fairness notion of envy-freeness (EF). It is known that with only divisible goods, envy-freeness implies proportionality but not vice versa. With only indivisible goods, the relaxed notion of EF, known as envy-freeness up to one item (EF1), and the relaxed notion of proportionality, MMS, do not imply each other [Caragiannis et al., 2016] . In a recent work, Bei et al. [2020] proposed a new envy-freeness notion, termed envy-freeness for mixed goods (EFM), that generalizes both EF and EF1 to the setting of mixed goods. In this section, we first investigate the relation between MMS and EFM in mixed goods setting.
We include the definition of EF, EF1, and EFM here for the sake of being self-contained.
Definition 5.1 (EF). An allocation A is said to satisfy envy-freeness (EF) if for any pair of agents
Definition 5.2 (EF1). With indivisible goods, an allocation A is said to satisfy envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) if
Definition 5.3 (EFM [Bei et al., 2020] ). An allocation A is said to satisfy envy-freeness for mixed goods (EFM) in the sense that for any i, j ∈ N ,
• if j's bundle consists of only indivisible goods, there exists g ∈ A j such that
We first investigate the relation between EFM and (full) MMS. In particular, we show that:
Lemma 5.4. Neither the MMS nor the EFM implies the other.
Proof. First note that an MMS allocation does not always exist with mixed goods, but EFM does [Bei et al., 2020] . This immediately shows that EFM does not imply MMS.
On the other hand, we show via the following example that MMS also does not imply EFM.
Example. Consider an instance with 2 agents N = {1, 2}, the set of indivisible goods M = {a, b}, and a homogeneous cake C. We list below the utilities of each agent for the goods:
Agent 1: u 1 (a) = 2, u 1 (b) = 1, u 1 (C) = 0.5.
Agent 2: u 2 (a) = 1.5, u 2 (b) = 2, u 2 (C) = 0.
One can check that the allocation ({b, C}, {a}) satisfies MMS. However, this allocation is not EFM because agent 2 envies agent 1, whose bundle contains divisible good.
Next, we consider the relation between EFM and the approximation of MMS, focusing on what approximation of MMS can be achieved by an EFM allocation.
On one hand, when goods are all divisible, EFM (reduced to EF) is always 1-MMS (reduces to proportionality). On the other hand, when goods are all indivisible, Amanatidis et al. [2018] showed that any EFM (reduces to EF1) allocation is always 1/n-MMS and this approximation ratio is tight. Then, with mixed goods, one might ask if an EFM allocation would have the MMS approximation ratio laying between 1 and 1/n. Our next lemma confirm this conjecture.
Lemma 5.5. Given any mixed goods instance (N, M ∪C), for any EFM allocation (A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n ) and any agent i ∈ N , we have
The proof is a direct generalization of the proof of Proposition 3.6 in Amanatidis et al. [2018] . From Lemma 5.5, we know that EFM implies α-MMS where α is a monotone increasing function that depends on the agent's value on the whole cake. In other words, one can directly utilize the EFM allocation to obtain an α-MMS allocation with α varied from 1/n (goods are indivisible only) to 1 (goods are divisible only). On the other hand, our result in Section 4 shows that we can always have an α-MMS allocation with α ranging from 1/2 to 1.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we study the extent to which we can find approximate MMS allocations when the resources contain both divisible and indivisible goods. We analyze the relation of the worst-case MMS approximation guarantees between mixed goods instances and indivisible goods instances. We also present an algorithm to produce an α-MMS allocation for any number of agents, where α monotonically increases in terms of the ratio between agents' values for the divisible goods and their MMS values. For future work, it would be interesting to improve the MMS approximation guarantee with mixed goods. Another working direction is to study fair allocations in the mixed goods setting in conjunction with economic efficiency notions such as Pareto optimality.
2. All entries of the last row and column, and the first entry in the first row, are positive (i.e., ∀i : M i,n , M n,i > 0 and M 1,1 > 0).
3. All rows and columns sum to 1 (i.e., M 1 = M ⊤ 1 = 1).
4. Define M + as the set of all positive entries in M . Then if we wish to partition M + into n subsets that sum to exactly 1, then our partition must correspond to either the rows of M or the columns of M .
Then construct two n × n matrices P + and P − . Let P + 1,1 = P − 1,1 = −ǫ, P + n,1 = P − 1,n = −ǫ, P + n,n = P − n,n = (2n − 3)ǫ, and P + n,i = P − i,n = −2ǫ for 2 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Take n = 6 as an example, we show below the construction of matrices P + and P − : Consider a matrix M satisfying all properties listed in Lemma A.1. By setting a properly small value ǫ, we can always make sure that every entry of M + P + and M + P − is non-negative. In the following, we will treat each entry as an indivisible good. We next divide N into two disjoint subsets. One contains ⌊ n 2 ⌋ agents, denoted by N + . The other contains the rest agents, denoted by N − . We let each agent i ∈ N + take the values of n 2 items as in matrix M + P + , and each agent i ∈ N − take the values of n 2 items as in matrix M + P − . We call this problem instance I. One can check that in this instance I, the MMS value for each agent i is 1 − ǫ.
According to the fourth property in Lemma A.1, there are only two ways to distribute these items into n bundles such that each bundle has value close to 1: either the rows of M or the columns of M . In each of these two partitions, we can always find at least 2 agents who value their bundles exactly 1− 2ǫ. For example, there are two such agents from N + if the partition is n columns, or two from N − if the partition is n rows. In particular, this means the MMS approximation guarantee γ(I) of this instance I is 1−2ǫ 1−ǫ . Suppose now we add a homogeneous cake to this problem instance I. This cake has value ǫ for each agent. Every agent's MMS value will now increase from 1 − ǫ to 1. However, in any allocation, there will still be at least two agents whose values for the indivisible goods are no more than 1 − 2ǫ. Then the best possible way to distribute the cake is to allocate it only to those agents, which means at least one such agent will receive a bundle of value at most 1 − 2ǫ + ǫ 2 = 1 − 3ǫ 2 . Thus, in this case, the MMS approximation ratio of such agent will be no more than 1 − 3ǫ 2 , which is strictly smaller than 1−2ǫ 1−ǫ when ǫ < 1/4.
